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Intentional Entanglement
ANDREW BROOKS

In Walter Benjamin’s work on Brecht’s epic theatre from 1936, there is an intention and a task
brought together in the figure of the “epic extension:” “the teacher’s first task would be to loosen
the dancer’s joints to the greatest possible extension” (SW 4, 303). Samuel Weber in reading said
section argues that for Benjamin “such stretching…is intended to reveal the articulations that
structure what is apparently a unified plot” or history or text or any seemingly unified system of
thinking and experience (103). The task of Benjamin’s Darstellung, and a task of translation is to
loosen one’s here-now limits of thinking and experience, and like a dancer this is done through a
series of stretches of seemingly disparate tensions. To enact said extension, I put forward an
entangled-retranslation form; that is a mode of literary criticism, whose form and means is
commentary and retranslation. A form that attempts the same intentions as Benjamin’s German
texts. A form as presentation of digression and interruption—a form of contemplation—
iteratively, with distortion, striving for other. Benjamin describes his own writing form as:
Darstellung ist der Inbegriff
ihrer [Traktate] Methode.
Darstellung als Umweg – das
ist denn der methodische
Charakter des Traktats.
Verzicht auf den
unabgesetzten Lauf der
Intention ist sein erstes
Kennzeichen. Ausdauernd
hebt das Denken stets von
neuem an, umständlich geht es
auf die Sache selbst zurück.
Dies unablässige Atemholen
ist die eigenste Daseinsform
der Kontemplation. (Benjamin
11)

Presentation is the crux of their
method. Method is indirection.
Presentation as indirection, as
the roundabout way—this, then,
is the methodological character
of the tractatus. Renunciation of
the unbroken course of intention
is its immediately distinguishing
feature. In its persevering,
thinking constantly begins anew;
with its sense of the
circumstantial, it goes back to
the thing itself. This continual
breathing in and out is the form
of existence most proper to
contemplation. (Eiland 2-3)

Its method is essentially
representation. Method is a
digression. Representation as
digression—such is the
methodological nature of the
treatise. The absence of an
uninterrupted purposeful
structure is its primary
characteristic. Tirelessly the
process of thinking makes new
beginnings, returning in a
roundabout way to its original
object. This continual pausing
for breath is the mode most
proper to the process of
contemplation. (Osbourn 28)

Darstellung is the embodiment
of their method. Darstellung as
re-detour—that is the
methodical character of the
Traktats. Sacrificing the
uninterrupted course of
intention is its first hallmark.
Enduring the thinking always
springs anew, roundaboutly it
goes back to the sake itself.
This unrelenting taking-abreath is the most proper
Daseinsform of contemplation.
(Brooks)1

Distortedly mirroring Benjamin, entangled-retranslation as a form and as a mode of reading
enacts a heteroglossic process between the source text, previous translations, and the translation
being produced; it moves in and out of etymological and allusive digressions, springs to other
texts and commentaries, and continually returns to the source-text to offer a retranslation inbetween the digressions and leaps, and in doing so encounters and reasons an interliminal space
of other possibilities.

I attempted my first translation in 2013: a French to English translation of Althusser’s “Idéologie
et appareils idéologiques d'État.” I had read Althusser’s essay a number of times and believed I
knew “what it meant.” I found the process of translation—the moving between the original,
between dictionaries and grammars, between secondary studies, etc. I found this process
I have limited myself to leaving “Traktat” “Darstellung” and “Daseinsform” untranslated. They are echoing each
other. Benjamin’s Darstellung takes the form of a Traktat which is the Daseinsform of thinking. This will be
returned to persistently.
1
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enjoyable. In lieu of “mastery” of the language or the text, I was just trying to learn through the
process. As I moved through the text, I found a few spots where I questioned the anthologized
Norton version, but for the most part my retranslation did not shift much. But then I got to the
section on “l’interpellation”, and I had a shocking experience. Nowhere in the original French
does the term “héler” occur— “hailing” is absent. I believe it was with this absence that I first
recognized the name Ben Brewster—whose 1971 translation of Althusser’s essay, anthologized
in Norton, is the text that I thought I knew “what it meant.” Brewster introduces a word, a
figure— “hailing”— that does not appear in the original French. The image of the officer is
there, but “héler” is not. Only the word “l’interpellation” is present. Brewster translates
“l’interpellation” into “interpellation or hailing” (the “or” implying adequacy) and he introduces
“hailing” prior to the image of the officer, effectively making “hailing” “interpellation.”
This was shocking for me—if I had known “what is meant” by “interpellation” through
“hailing” had I known “what is meant” at all? How did such a misunderstanding occur? I
seemingly forgot it was a translation. Brewster’s name is marked in the Norton version; it states
it is a translation and yet in the drive to know “what is meant,” I had forgotten it was a
translation—until in retranslating myself, I remembered.
My point here is an experience: the shock I experienced in retranslating Althusser, —the
shock of remembering, of re-cognizing—the recognition of how much I misunderstand
“interpellation.” And I did not misunderstand from a complexity of the idea per se, because such
complexity is disguised in a reductive deformation due to a didactic intention; I never
encountered “interpellation” itself, but only as already translated, contextualized, and canonized.
In the case of Brewster this is the “choice” of the translator to reduce complexity through a
singular figure and a solidifying of context.2 “L’interpellation” instead of being questioned in a
shifting context as present in the original—where it could possibly imply different verbs like
“constitute,” “recruit,” “plead,” “interrupt,” “prevent”—becomes reductively the context of “on
the street” and the verb of “hailing.” Translations that have a didactic-intention are reductive out
a demand for clarity and distinction (i.e., the entanglement between the source-text, institutional
pressures, and readability) leading to mis-readings masquerading as understanding: mis-readings
masquerading as clear and stable meanings with clear and stable contexts.
And yet, Althusser straddles a line for me. His writing isn’t what I have in mind when I
think about Darstellung or entangled-retranslation. Rather, I specifically have in mind writers
like Walter Benjamin: theorists who recognize an impossible distance between the “manner of
meaning” [Art des Meinens] and “what is meant” [Gemeinte] and the impossible necessity of
attempting to bridge this distance for the sake of significance; authors who utilize rhetoric in an

The doublement of “or hailing” contextually makes sense with Althusser’s striking image of the police officer on
the street and the historical context of 1968; however, the inclusion of “or hailing” with all other occurrences of
“l’interpellation” carries with it the unifying image of the police officer. Thus, reducing the potentiality of
‘interpellation’ and arguably placing an ideological focus on RSAs, in lieu of ISAs, which are more prevalent in
regard to the institutions and systems involved in the translation, canonization, and teaching of the specific essay.
See: “Althusser, Benjamin, and the Interruptive Beaconing of Retranslation” by Andrew Brooks, for a detailed
reading of “Interpellation” and Brewster’s translation, in response to Warren Montag’s essay from summer of 2020
“Althusser’s Empty Signifier.”
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intentional manner to bring about an experience in the reader of that impossible necessity. 3
What this experience is shifts with iterations, but for the reductionist sake of clarity, we might
think of it in the manner of a semi-messianic experience: it is not an experience of an
intentionless thing-in-itself or absolute as-is, but rather an experience of an as-if precommunicative movement of language (be it visual, verbal, musical, etc.)4 This experience

In his reading of Benjamin’s essay, Weber marks two conceptions of “intention.” The intention of the translator
“stresses the discontinuous separation between movement of mind or language, between a pointing-at, and that at
which one is pointing” (71). And yet also, Weber argues Benjamin uses “intention” in regard to the poet, where it
implies a “fulfillment and fusion” (71). There is a tension between the Translator as enacting a fragmenting,
discontinuous process, and that of the Poet bringing about a fusion through image. Possibly at odds with this
understanding, in the opening paragraph, I have made the claim that retranslation “shares the same intention” as
Benjamin’s source text. Both Benjamin’s source-text and retranslation attempt to bring about an encounter through
paradoxical Darstellung of fulfillment and discontinuity—both potentially bring about an encounter with ‘truth’ as a
presenting-itself; neither is a communicative accumulation of knowledge. Both hold the seemingly opposing
intentions in tension; this is encountered in an allegorical manner through the process of retranslation. That is, the
movement between the various translations and the source-text mark allegorically the immanent affinities between
an absolute and the finite, manifested in rhythms of distortions of a continuity, in the attempting of a fulfillment.
That is, the process of retranslation foregrounds its own finitude in discontinuous markings of other translations
unfolded historically; and in foregrounding its own finitude, the continuity of the source-text is also marked in the
foregrounded distortions between previous translations and source-text; thus, there occurs a marking of a
continuity—even if the source text is thought of merely as graphic marks arranged in a specific form—as the
distortions, both synchronically between languages and diachronically through the previous translations in targetlanguage texts.
3

In Benjamin’s pre-1930s writings, a few images and concepts are described as “intentionless”: “Pure language”
and “Truth.” “Pure-language” is a figurative conception of ‘truth’ as the bringing together of ideas: “Truth
actualized in the round dance of presented ideas” (Eiland 4). “Pure Language” is an as-if fully-supplemented to the
point of an Allheit state; yet such is only ever present as the fragmented peculiar intentions of each language brought
together. It is the task of the translator to re-present and release the possible intentions in a sehnsüchtig striving for
the fully-supplemented impossible intentionlessness. Thus the “brot” and “pain” example in the Task of the
Translator or the remarks on “ideas” and “truth” from the Epistemo-Critical Prologue:
The being of ideas simply cannot be conceived of as an object of vision, even intellectual vision. For even
in its most paradoxical periphrasis, as intellectus archetypus, vision does not enter into the form of
existence, which is peculiar to truth, which is devoid of all intention, and certainly does not itself appear as
intention. Truth does not enter into relationships, particularly intentional ones. The object of knowledge,
determined as it is by the intention inherent in the concept, is not the truth. Truth is an intentionless state of
being, made up of ideas. The proper approach to it is not therefore one of intention and knowledge, but
rather a total immersion and absorption in it. Truth is the death of intention. This, indeed, is just what could
be meant by the story of the veiled image of Sais, the unveiling of which was fatal for whomsoever thought
thereby to learn the truth. (Osbourn 35-36)
Truth and pure-language share the same intentionlessness; and as such both only enter “intellectual vision” in herenow (i.e., the historical privileged configurations of a time/space) distorted presentations, delimited by here-now
intentions—be them specific languages or concepts or figurations or translations. Thus, intellectual comprehension
of pure-language and truth is intentional. Such is present in Benjamin’s work as as-if distortions—as “purelanguage” and “Truth,” (thought of rhetorically and with unstable terminological auras.) While to encounter purelanguage or truth as-such requires a dangerously immersive experience, an emptying of intentions. Translation at
times toes-the-line of this immersion. Though in a general sense each translation is ideologically-cued and bound-to
its specific here-now configuration, making individual translations historical interpretations of a source text; in the
most immersed forms of translation Benjamin argues one finds fatality and madness, i.e. intentionlessness,
unbounded from here-now: for the “unveiling of” the image of Sais is “fatal,” and Hölderlin’s late translations,
standing as examples of the “enormous and original fear of all translation” [ungeheure und ursprüngliche Gefahr
4
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houses the potentiality for a transformation of consciousness/context; for when a here-now
configuration is disrupted—when the continuity interrupts and is recognized as the distortions—
it allows the limits of said configuration to alter, stretching to think and experience other. This
experience is of what we must forget, or misrecognize, for the “what is meant” to seemingly
ossify. Benjamin in the “Task of the Translator” describes this pre-“what is meant” as being “…
[encountered as]5 engaged in steady changing [Wandel], until it [what-is-meant] as the harmony
of all those manners of meanings [Art des Meinens] emerges-out as the pure-language” (7.13).6
The experience of this is brought about through an intensive dance in-between “what is meant”
and “manner of meaning.”7
For an example: Benjamin writes, “in a wonderful insistent manner it [translation] atleast points [hindeutet] toward the predetermined, failed [versagten] domain of Reconciliationand Fulfillment of Languages” (8.3). Translation points towards the “what-is-meant” through its
various already failed “manners.” “Hindeutet” as a verb implies “indicating” and “pointing;” it
can be broken down into the prefix “hin-” implying movement and root “deutet” [deuten] as “topoint,” “to-interpret,” “to-beckon.” Translation as ideologically cued, as a historically marked
interpretation i.e., as a product of a here-now configuration, “points” and “beckons” to that
which lies beyond the limits of its own here-now finitude, beyond its own time-bound “manner.”
The beyond—in this cited “manner” a “domain of Fulfillment and Reconciliation”—in
retranslation allegorically refers to both the actual source-text and to other possible
interpretations—other unread possible configurations contained immanently in the here-now
“manner.” Moreover, “versagten” as a preterite verb form points to the what-is-meant in its
performative usage. “Versagten” indicates an action at a determined moment in the past,
implying “failed;” but also “failed to say” or “said wrongly” as an event in the past, or even “the
past event of failing to say or saying wrongly.” Failure, necessity, and distortion are immanent to
the event of translation. The experience I am striving for, the meaning I am attempting to grasp,
aller Übersetzung] (12.9), are “enclosed in silence” or “plunge the sense [Sinn] from abyss to abyss, until it
threatens—in bottomless languagedepth—itself to-lose” (12.7).
As such, my use of a phrase like, “pre-communicative movement of language,” is only ever an as-if, with intention,
and therefore marks an ideologically-cued moment in thinking and writing about actuality and possibility; and as an
intentional distortion is as-if a dance between “truth” and truth, between what-is-meant and manner-of-meaning,
which are also as-if, and so on ad infinitum (or until the emergence of the inconceivable messianic)…
5

Referring back to “anzutreffen” earlier in the sentence.

To use Benjamin’s language from “The Task of the Translator.” When quoting my own translations, I will cite
paragraph followed by sentence. For example: (10.21) refers to paragraph ten sentence twenty-one of the “Task of
the Translator” essay.
6

Samul Weber in -abilities offers an in-depth distinction and discussion of these terms in Benjamin’s work: “…that
between ‘the meant’ and ‘the way of meaning.’ Languages, he argues, are identical in what they mean: they all mean
the same things, they all have the same ‘Gemeinte.’ What distinguishes them is the way they mean these things,
their Art des Meinens. It is the relation of different ways of meaning, tied to the differences between and within
languages, that constitutes the true object of the translator. The task of the translator consists, first, in relating the
distinctive ways of meaning in different languages to one another, and secondly and correlatively, in bringing out
what is ultimately ‘meant’—signified—by these different but related ways of meaning: namely, ‘pure language’
itself.” (71).
7
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has always-already failed to say; and yet, the “manner’s” distorted presentation’s attempting to
“at least point” is “insistent;” the absolute, the “what-is-meant,” the “pure language,” “the
domain of fulfillment and reconciliation,” i.e. a continuity, is yet always presenting, disruptive to
the claim-of-readability in its own “beaconing.” The experience of this rhetorical stammering, as
it points beyond, is an intention of Benjamin’s text.
Certain strains of critical theory strive for this rhetorical experience to occur in the reader
as the reader strives for “what is meant.” In my experience this is a pleasurable but arduous
process—a digressive halting movement towards and away from the text—deep dives into
etymologies, leaping to other texts, gleaning commentaries—it is an inter- and intra-textual
experience—which comes, hopefully, with a few shocks, i.e., such theory, in original or
translation, is experienced as a process of reading as entangled-retranslation.
This implies the experience of retranslating is the very experience of reading such critical
theory—a perpetual questioning of the relationship between “manner” and “meant,” and an
already failed striving for a domain of fulfillment and reconciliation, beyond the finitude of the
here-now. Moreover, when the “what is meant” is an experience of the “manner” bumping-upagainst the “what is meant,” the “manner” becomes paramount for said experience. Such
“manner” takes on a performative Darstellung. In English, Althusser’s “interpellation” meant
“hailing;” until in translation, there occurred an experience of the “manner” of the two texts.
Then, simultaneously, “interpellation” was unbounded by here-now configurations, releasing a
potentiality—and I had a momentary experience of language-in-flux, context and meaning
shifting and yet the French text continually stayed materially the same—and I had to think, to
question: “what is meant” by this “manner”?
So, how is such an experience brought about? What Brewster’s translation of Althusser
highlights is an intention corresponding to a form: what Benjamin calls a didactic intention.8 In
the opening paragraph of the “Epistemo-Critical Prologue,” Benjamin argues that 19th century
philosophy, under the privileged configuration of mathematical and scientific attempts to
“eliminat[e] the problem of presentation” [Elimination des Darstellungsproblems] (11), develops
a conception and form of “system” that as “syncretism” [Synkretismus] claims the “didactic
authority of Doctrine” [die didaktische Autorität der Lehre] (11), and in doing so attempts to
repress the “Esoterik” aspect of things (all that which can’t be explained in the depth and scope
of the system); which nonetheless said dogmatic doctrinal system is unable to disown, shed, or
acknowledge. In lieu of said system and the conception of philosophy “as a mediating guide to
knowledge” [als vermittelnde Anleitung zum Erkennen] (11), Benjamin recognizes philosophy
as a “presentation of truth” [Darstellung der Wahrheit], which must foreground the “practice of
this its form” [Übung dieser ihrer Form] (11). Thus, as in “all ages in which the uninscribable
Such “intention” is always ideologically cued, always within a here-now; thus, in our current age, in my current
positionality, a didactic intention of translation is delineated by academia and publishing industry directly and their
demands for “readability”; this stands often in disrespect with the intentions of a source text. Thus, distortions in
translation are not just the product of authorial and translator intention, but also mark what must be done to gain a
PhD., an instructor position, tenure, to get published, etc., and yet still said distortions also mark the source-text’s
intentions as distortions. The slipperiness of such “intention’s” meaning marks the manner in which socio-economic
determinations delineate unconscious intentions. Thus, one could catalogue distortion trends in translation practices
for a specific age, and simultaneously mark systemic pressures for “readability,” which corresponds to the privileged
here-now configuration.
8
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essentiality of the true has stood before one’s eyes” [die unumschreibliche Wesenheit des
Wahren vor Augen stand], a propaedeutic form is present. One termed ‘Traktat;’ such a form
contains a latent hint towards the “Esoterik,” the objects of theology—that which is beyond yet
immanent—which are necessary for the thinking of truth (11).9 The Traktat form “may be
doctrinal in tone” but is denied the authoritative didactic (seeming) conclusiveness of the
doctrinal form; its intention, via its usage of authoritative citations, is “almost more educative
than didactic” [einer mehr fast erziehlichen als lehrenden Intention] (11). This movement from
didactic to more educative is brought about by Traktat’s form disrupting the didactic intention
from moving into systemization. For “sacrifice of the uninterrupted course of intention is
[Traktat’s] first hallmark” [Verzicht auf den unabgesetzten Lauf der Intention ist sein erstes
Kennzeichen] (11). The Traktate’ form disrupts intention from reaching systemization.
In a reductionist reading for the sake of clarity, “Lehre10” as doctrine and its didactic
intention seems to be set against “Traktat” and its educational intention. However, there is not a
diametric opposition, but rather Traktat form is privileged by Benjamin because it foregrounds
its own form. Thus, Traktat is able to allow a continual anew practice of a doctrinal didactic
intention, while simultaneously its form interrupts intention’s movement into a systematic
conclusiveness, holding seeming sides in tension. In doing so, the “lehrenden” intention is
reconfigured into an almost more “erziehenlichen” intention—where a redrawing, a
reconfiguration, a stretching is immanent.
Retranslation attempts to do the same. Retranslation is similar in some respects to the
Traktat; for retranslation maintains a tension between recognizing its own finitude and yet still
striving for an impossible ideal translation of the source text. Both Traktat and retranslation are
forms of immanent criticism; both reject “timeless” i.e., dogmatic standards of judgment and
systemization, while simultaneously refusing a dissolution of any criteria all together, still
allowing for the possibility of the absolute to present as distortions in the here-now forms. Both
strive for and fail to grasp the immanent germ of impartibility and translatability respectfully,
while still simultaneously marking said germ in the failure and striving. Of course, for Benjamin
and many theorists all translation is a form of immanent criticism. As Berman states in his
commentary on Benjamin’s “Task of the Translator:” “What the original text calls for with all of
its strength, so that the meaning immanent in its translatability can come into being, is the act of
translation” (79). However, with retranslation, as Chantal Wright writes in her commentary on
Berman’s commentary: “the translator does not come to the text unaffected by earlier
readings…But acknowledge[es] the influence of previous translations” (25). Retranslation
continually confronts its own finitude in a manner that marks the distortions of its own
presenting, while simultaneously still striving for a reconciliation of “manner of meaning” and

„…in einer Propädeutik aufgenötigt, die man mit dem scholastischen Terminus des Traktats darum ansprechen
darf, weil er jenen wenn auch latenten Hinweis auf die Gegenstände der Theologie enthält, ohne welche der
Wahrheit nicht gedacht werden kann.“ (11)
9

Peter Fenves offers an influential interpretation of “Lehre,” as use in an earlier essay of Benjamins: “The name of
this counterpoint to the ‘fact of science’ is Lehre (doctrine, teaching, theory), which ‘teaches’ only the transient
moment of its transmission” (5). Lehre “suggests a veridical transition, a transition into truth… which should
probably be translated as ‘doctrine’ but which, like doctrine, derives from the word for ‘teaching’ or ‘learning,’
lehren… so ‘doctrine’ must be continually taught in order for it to be ‘doctrinal’” (42-43).
10
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“what is meant.” In so doing, other possible meanings and experience present themselves, i.e.,
the here-now configuration stretches, shifts, reconfigures.
Such a conception of translation as retranslation is in line with the ending of Benjamin’s
“Task of the Translator,” where Benjamin emphasizes translation’s fidelity to the Wörtlichkeit—
the literalityness, or word-to-word.
Vielmehr ist eben das die Bedeutung der Treue, welche durch Wörtlichkeit verbürgt wird,
daß die große Sehnsucht nach Sprachergänzung aus dem Werke spreche. Die wahre
Übersetzung ist durchscheinend… (Benjamin)
Rather, the significance of fidelity as ensured by literalness is that the work reflects the
great longing for linguistic complementation. A real translation is transparent… (Zohn)
On the contrary, the meaning of the fidelity ensured by literal translation is that the great
longing for the completion of language is expressed by the work. True translation is
transparent… (Rendall)
Rather it is precisely the denoting [Bedeutung] of fidelity, which shall be vouched for
through literalityness [Wörtlichkeit], that the great Sehnsucht for supplemented-language
[Sprachergänzung] speaks out of the work. The real translation is translucent
[durchscheinend]… (10.24)
“Bedeuten” implies a “denoting” towards the word as a materiality of the letter, as the continuity
of graphic marks arranged. In the limits of the citation, Zohn and Rendall’s “meaning” and
“significance” seem fine, but in the context of the essay overall I believe “denoting” is hinted
at.11 “Sprachergänzung” implies a messianic supplemented-language: the Gemeinte, the purelanguage, the domain of reconciliation and fulfillment. In Zohn’s “linguistic complementation”
there seems to be a repressing of the more esoteric implication; in Rendall’s “completion of
language” the esoteric seems present, but maybe a progressive notion and a conclusiveness is
implied. “Supplemented-language” may be too close to a neologism, but the implication is not
for a completion, but for a continual attempting via supplemental language i.e., for Fortleben.
The “Sprachergänzung” is felt as a “Sehnsucht.” Zohn and Rendall’s choice of “longing” makes
sense, but the word, Sehnsucht, is untranslatable, implying a continually renewed
longing/striving not just for a return but also for a departure towards something indeterminate.
Sehnsucht speaks out of — “auf…spreche”—the work itself. Zohn’s “reflects” distorts a material
affinity; Rendall’s “expresses” is closer but loses an “echoing” occurring throughout the entire
essay around hearing/speaking/echoing ‘from the work.’ Lastly, the translation of
“durchscheinend” as “transparent” by Zohn and Rendall is a telling distortion. Chantal Wright, in
reference to Berman’s commentary, describes Benjamin’s idea of ‘translucent’ as “like washi,
the paper that is used for room dividers in traditional Japanese houses” (Age 181). This is
There appears to be three types of “meaning” in Benjamin’s “Task of the Translation”: Sinn, Bedeuten,
Gemeintes. (Remember that the text itself will disrupt the following classification if taken too far.) “Sinn” equates to
that which “bad” translators emphasize with the smoothing over of syntax, hence the illusion of “conveyed”
meaning. “Bedeuten” marks a marking of the word as the letter, i.e., what fidelity to the text aims for. And
“Gemeintes” implies a messianic completely-supplemented-meaning. Unfortunately, Zohn and Rendall tend to
translate all three with ‘meaning’ ‘significance’ etc. without a fidelity to repetition.
11
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apropos, for “translucent” implies that the medium is present as medium; the “translation”
denotes its form.
Thus, translation in the form of a literal-translation, which is faithful to the source-text
through Wörtlichkeit (and as such is resistant to the didactic intention of readability for the
target-language) denotes towards its own materiality. The absolute—distorted here as
“Sprachergänzung,” “linguistic complementation,” “supplemented-languages”—is present only
in distortions, in the mode of Sehnsucht, and in the form of a translation that is translucently
visible. I argue that the form of retranslation itself halts the didactic intention (complex as
authorial and social) from claiming a systematic authority (a readability judged as “correct”), and
yet still heeds the beacon of the text, the Sehnsucht, and strives for translation.
In summary, if the intentio of the original is intentions brought to tension causing a halted
stretching, and it is the task of translation to “give voice to the intentio…as a supplement”
(10.21), then translation’s task is to call attention to itself as translation. Not just a few footnotes,
or an introduction, or an afterwards commentary—but as a form where the tensions between
“manner” and “meant,” where didactic intentions, can strive for an impossible ideal, because the
form itself will disrupt its arrival at a systematic conclusiveness, thus bringing about an intention
to stretch, i.e., entangled-retranslation.

LIVING IN LANGUAGES (2021)
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